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In any federal system, the nature and conditions of the financial relations are crucial to the survival of 
the country. In fact, in most federal countries, the federating states always have some issues such as 
discourse, dispute and wrangling with the centre. The issue is centred on the problem of securing 
adequate financial resources to discharge essential political and constitutional responsibilities. Nigeria 
is not an exception. The decision as to what percentage of centrally generated revenue that would be 
retained among the tiers of government has always been a problem. These anomalies, the article 
contend must be remedied in order to sustain a true federal system in Nigeria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This intellectual disquisition is designed to critically and 
comparatively assess the role of the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission. The 
Babangida administration by virtue of Decree No. 49 of 
1989, established the National Revenue Mobilization 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC) to among 
other things review periodically, the revenue allocation 
principles and formulas and to prescribe and apply the 
approved formulas which the federal government would 
use in the sharing of the federation account between the 
three tiers of government. 
At the core of this paper, is a comparative assessment 
of Nigerian brand of intergovernmental fiscal relations vis-
à-vis that of Australia, Canada and USA in view of its 
mechanics and dynamics of implementation. In order to 
achieve this, the paper examines the composition, 
functions and political dynamics affecting the commission 
in its onerous responsibility to oversee the revenue 
sharing formula amongst federal, states and local 
governments as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria.  Essentially,  section  153  of 
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the 1999 Constitution provided for the establishment of 
the National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission with its Chairman appointed by the 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
In view of the historical commitment to federalism as a 
means of coexistence and unity, fiscal federalism has 
been an important and central feature of inter-
governmental relations in Nigeria. The construction of a 
stable and acceptable inter-governmental fiscal relation 
has been the subject of many commissions and 
committees since 1914 (Ezra, 1960); today the issue still 
evoke virulent contestations amongst politicians and 
academics. 
According to the (Hick-Phillipson report, 1951: 68), the 
controversy over revenue allocation dates back to the 
origin of Nigeria. From 1901 to 1914, Northern Nigeria 
was dependent on outside assistance in order to balance 
her budgets. Each year it received a large grant from the 
imperial government and contributions from the southern 
Nigeria in lieu of customs revenue. Amalgamation 
therefore became a clever ploy by the colonial 
government to reduce the dependence of Northern 
Nigeria on the British taxpayers. This act provoked bitter 
controversy at the time rousing resentment of educated 
elites    and    some    British   administrators   (quoted   in 
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Osadolor, 1998: 35). This virulent and contentious issue 
has persisted till independent and post independent era 
(Ake, 1982, 1991, 1996). Between 1948 till date, nine 
commissions, six military decrees, one Act of the 
legislature and two Supreme Court judgments have been 
resorted to in defining and modifying fiscal interre- 
lationship among the component parts of the federation 
(Ozon-Eso, 2005). The inconclusive discussion of the 
issue at the 2005 Political Reform Conference is the 
latest attempt to define or redefine or interpret the 
framework for revenue sharing both vertically between 
centre-states and horizontally amongst states of the 
federation. The paper therefore examines the nature of 
Nigerian federalism and how it has created instability as a 
result of allocation of resources among the federating 
states in the country. 
This paper is structured as follows: introduction and 
theoretical framework; the composition, functions and 
political forces at play that have impacted favourably or 
otherwise on the commission’s role; inter-governmental 
fiscal relations in federal system like Australia, Canada, 
United States of America and Nigeria; conclusion and 
recommendations. 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Federalism as a political system was adopted to cater for 
diversities and heterogeneity of these societies as well as 
address the twin issues of maintaining unity while 
preserving diversity (Davis, 1967; Adamolekun and 
Kincaid, 1991). It is considered in these circumstances as 
a means of preventing a single group from dominating 
the others as well as monopolizing the consumption of 
public goods. Federalism, therefore, is not only a means 
of forging unity in a society but also an attempt to allay 
fears of domination of one group by another. More so, it 
is only federalism which satisfies the desire for a national 
identity, retention of separate local identities and a 
corresponding distribution of governmental power 
(Nicholson, 1966). 
Some writers on federalism stress that governments 
within federal system have not been independent of each 
other but have in practice been interdependent and 
interacted with each other in a relationship of both 
cooperation and rivalry (Duchacck, 1970; Akinyemi, et al., 
1979). Eme Awa in his analysis of federal government 
argues that federalism involves cooperation, bargaining 
and conflict. There has always been a measure of 
cooperation between the two levels of government. Such 
cooperation increases in scope and quality as the 
federation matures (Awa, 1976: 6–7; also see King, 
1982). Watts view reinforces Awa’s. He explains that 
traditional definition of the federal form of political 
organization has many difficulties as no single federation 
has fully embodied the federal principles  as  others  have  
 
 
 
 
enunciated.  This has led many writers to assert that it is 
more appropriate to use the term “cooperative 
federalism” in describing a federal government (Watt, 
1970) cited in Omotola (2006). Jinadu (1982) view 
federalism as a form of governmental and institutional 
structure, deliberately designed by political architects to 
cope with the twin but difficult task of maintaining unity 
while also preserving diversity. According to K.C. 
Wheare, federalism is a method of dividing powers so 
that general and regional governments are each within a 
sphere, coordinate and independent. Wheare’s formu- 
lation or conceptualization portrays federalism as a 
principle of organization and practice whose ultimate test 
is how the federal system operates. He sees federal 
government as a constitutional arrangement, which 
divides law-making powers and functions between two 
levels of government (Wheare, 1963; Omotola, 2006:23). 
Rufus (1967: 9) while agreeing with Wheare for the most 
part dismisses as unattainable his requirement of 
financial autonomy. He rather suggests some equali- 
zation grant to be controlled by the central government. 
This he believes would further a uniform standard among 
the components units of the federation. Again he said, to 
be meaningful, the standard of sufficiency for each unit 
must be related at least, to the business of any fiscal 
scheme as to ensure that each unit will be able to reach 
the standard preferably, by its own efforts. 
Friedrich (1966: 786) in an attempt to explain 
federalism avoids the pitfall in Wheare’s conceptua- 
lization of federalism. He argues that federalism is a 
process by which unity and diversity are politically 
organized and this process includes persons, institutions, 
etc. To him a federation is a group of states united 
together by certain common objectives while maintaining 
their distinctive group character in other spheres. 
Livingstone (1952) is another scholar who has clarified 
the federal principle. He opines that federal structure 
comes about as a result of socio-economic, cultural and 
political interaction. While noting that the documentary 
constitution may be a poor guide as to whether a political 
system is federal or otherwise, he explains that the 
essential nature of federalism is to be sought for not in 
the shading of legal and constitutional terminology, but in 
the forces of economic, socio-political and cultural that 
have made their outward forms of federalism necessary. 
The essence of federalism lies not in the society itself. 
Federal government is a device by which the federal 
qualities of the society are articulated and protected. This 
explanation by Livingstone is also a departure from 
Wheare’s construct. 
Etzioni (1965) sees federalism as an attempt to cope 
with the problem of power. On this premise, conflict is 
endemic to the unification process and such sociological 
variables as ethnicity, religion will feature prominently in 
the conflict. A successful operation of federalism is 
basically  a  resourceful  attention  and  tackling  of  these  
  
 
 
 
 
awkwardly divisive tendencies inherent in most  political 
(federal) set ups. At this point, we examine briefly fiscal 
federalism. In attempting to define the scope of fiscal 
federalism in Nigeria, it is pertinent to note that 
government plays a very important role in the economy. 
This fact is even more crucial in developing countries like 
Nigeria. Through various policies, government is able to 
guide and influence development direction of the 
economy and the general wellbeing of the state 
(Diamond et al., 1998). Fiscal policy therefore means part 
of government policy that is concerned with raising 
revenue through taxation and other means and deciding 
on the level and pattern of expenditure (Wheare cited in 
Ugoh, 2004: 63). In general, fiscal policy is that part of 
the overall state policy which operates through the 
revenue and expenditure measures of the public budget 
(Adedeji, 1969). The present study therefore is 
concerned with the revenue aspect of fiscal policy 
especially how this has been used to raise revenue and 
the manner of its distribution through the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 
in the federal system of government in Nigeria. 
Composition, functions and political forces affecting the 
Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission.  
 
 
Composition 
 
The third schedule, part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission shall be 
composed of the following under listed members: 
 
1) A chairman 
2) One member each from each state of the Federation 
and the Federal Capital Territory – Abuja, who is the 
opinion of the president are persons of unquestionable 
integrity with requisite qualification and experience 
(Constitution, 1999: 147). 
 
In reality, the President’s appointment of the chairman 
and the other members does not portray that all members 
have the qualification and most importantly the expe- 
rience necessary to perform this onerous responsibility. 
For instance, during the faceoff between President 
Obasanjo and his Vice President Atiku Abubakar, there 
were various allegations and horse trading between the 
duo as to what the chairman of the commission should or 
should not have done. This clearly demonstrates that the 
Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
cannot be compared to the Canadian or Australian type 
where its composition is of tested professionals and 
technocrats devoid of partisan involvement. 
 
 
Functions 
 
The functions of the commission as outlined  in  the  1999 
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constitution are thus: 
 
1) To monitor the accruals to and disbursement of 
revenue from the Federal account. 
2) Review from time to time, the revenue allocation 
formula and principles in operations to ensure conformity 
with changing realities, provided that any revenue 
formula which has been accepted by an Act of the 
National Assembly shall remain in force for a period of 
not less than five years from the date of the 
commencement of the Act; 
3) To advise the Federal and State Governments on the 
fiscal efficiency and methods by which their revenue can 
be increased; 
4) To determine the remuneration appropriate for political 
holders including the President, vice President, 
Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers, Commi- 
ssioners, Special Advisers, Legislators and the holders of 
office mentioned in section 84 and 124 of the constitution 
5) To discharge such other functions as are conferred on 
the commission by the constitution or any Act of the 
National Assembly (Constitution, 1999: 147 - 8). 
The afore-mentioned functions notwithstanding, 
successive constitutions have always vested the 
responsibility for the collection of a large proportion of 
national revenue on the Federal Government, a situation 
that tend to enrich the centre at the expense of the 
federating units and Local Governments (Dudley,1982). 
Thus, the Hamman Tuker Commission on Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
recommended 13% derivation in the new allocation 
formulae released in 2001 which has its root in the 
recommendation of the 1995 Constitutional Conference 
(Nigerian Tribune, 11 September, 2001: 12). The Federal 
Government then instructed that 50% of the 13% from 
the derivation account should go to the oil-producing 
areas and the reminder should be channelled to the 
newly established Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) (The Punch, October 11, 1993: 13). 
Federal control of agencies established with special 
funds like the Oil and Mineral Producing Areas Develop- 
ment Commission, Petroleum Trust Fund and Niger Delta 
Development Commission, apart from lack of fairness 
and equity in the discharge of their functions, tended to 
discourage initiatives and creativeness as they co-opt all 
other units in a general manner with little or no regards 
for local peculiarities (Akinsanya and Ayoade, 2005: 156). 
 
 
Political forces affecting the Revenue Mobilization 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
 
A feature of the 1999 Constitution was the provision 
under Section 162, which established some principles to 
be applied by both the Revenue Mobilization Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission and the National Assembly on 
the subject of revenue allocation. 
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Sub-section 2 of section 162 of the 1999 Constitution 
stipulates that the President upon receipt of advice from 
the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commis- 
sion, shall table before the National Assembly, proposals 
for revenue allocation from the federation account, and in 
determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take 
into account, the allocation principles especially those of 
the population, equality of states, internal revenue gene- 
ration, land mass, terrain as well as population density. 
This sub-section further stipulated that the principles of 
derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved 
formula as being not less than thirteen percent of the 
revenue accruing to the Federation Account from any 
natural resources. 
Section 162 sub-sections 3-8 of the 1999 Constitution 
provided for the mode of revenue allocation not only 
between the Federal Government and the State 
Government, but also with the Local Governments which 
were recognized as the third tier of government. 
Consequently, any amount standing to the credit of the 
federation account must be distributed amongst the 
Federal, State and Local Government councils in each 
state on such terms and in such manner as may be 
prescribed by the National Assembly. Furthermore, any 
amount standing in the credit of the states in the 
Federation Account shall be distributed among the states 
on such term and in such manner as may be prescribed 
by the National Assembly. Similarly, any amount standing 
in the credit of Local Government councils in the 
Federation Account shall be allocated to the States for 
the benefit of their Local Government Council on such 
terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the 
National Assembly. 
Section 162 sub-section 6 of the 1999 Constitution 
specifically noted that each state shall maintain a special 
account to be called “state joint local government 
account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the 
local government councils of the state from the federation 
account and from the government of the state. While sub-
section 7 of section 162 maintained that each state pay to 
local government councils in its area of jurisdiction such 
proportion of its revenue on such terms and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.   
At the level of praxis, the Revenue Mobilization 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission in 2000 recommended 
a review of the existing sharing formula thus: 
 
Federal Government  41.3% 
State Government  30.7% 
Local Government  15.0% 
Special Funds   13.0% 
 
The Commission also recommended that the horizontal 
disbursement of funds amongst States and Local 
Government should be as follows: 
 
Equity     4.5% 
 
 
 
 
Population    2.5% 
Population density   2.0% 
Internal revenue effort              8.0% 
Land Mass    5.0% 
Terrain                5.0% 
Rural roads and waterways             1.5% 
Portable Water               1.5% 
Education    4.0% 
Health     3.0% 
 
The Commission recommended that 60% of the 
derivation fund be allocated to the federating states and 
40% to the Local Government Councils in the oil-
producing areas.  The Southern states were dissatisfied 
with this allocation formula because it was contrary to the 
practice in the first Republic especially as derivation has 
become anathema.  Furthermore, more revenue would 
and should have been available to them for 
developmental purposes. 
The oil-producing states went to court for judicial 
interpretation of relevant section of the constitution.  The 
Supreme Court made adjustment to the afore-mentioned 
recommendations as: 
 
Federal Government             46.43% 
State Government  33.20% 
Local Government  20.73% 
 
Bolaji Omitola asserts that the federal government not 
only set aside the recommendation of the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, but also 
the recommendation of the Supreme Court as President 
Olusegun Obasanjo issued an executive order pursuant 
to section 315 of the constitution pending the approval of 
a new revenue allocation formula by the National 
Assembly (Akinsanya and Ayoade, 2005: 156). The 
executive order as was expected gave executive share of 
(54.68%) to the Federal Government (The Punch, March 
2nd, 2004: 3; Ugoh 2011: 119 – 120). 
The perennial and sometimes conflict-ridden relation- 
ship between the Federal and State Governments over 
revenue allocation is indicative of how the country has 
deviated from the original idea of federalism (Achebe, 
1983). Revenue allocation based on derivation was 
practiced in Nigeria form 1950s to 1967 when the twelve 
states federal structure was created. The reason for 
aborting this principle according to the federal govern- 
ment was to allow for even development of the twelve 
states. Rather than develop locally based resources; 
most of the states now wait for largesse from the federal 
government in the name of allocation from oil revenue 
(Ige, 1995). The present states of fiscal federalism stifled 
local initiative, promote inefficiency and fostered a sense 
of overdependence on the federal government (Olukoshi, 
1991). Indeed, it has created a   system that discouraged  
work by having booty capitalism which is shared every 
month.    Adherents    of    federalism   asserts   that   this 
  
 
 
 
 
paternalistic form of federalism does not sustain 
development as it rather encourages crisis and conflict as 
manifested in the Niger Delta. 
In the economic realm, the oil producing areas have 
been subjected to abject neglect (Naanen, 1995). The 
area has remained the most underdeveloped, lacking in 
modern infrastructure, such as roads, education, medical 
facilities, electricity, etc. The traditional economic 
activities of the region such as fishing and farming have 
been ravaged by pollution and environmental degradation 
associated with oil exploration Obi, 1977 also see Obi 
1997). The region has the highest rate of unemployment. 
Thus, while it is a treasure base with black gold, it is also 
paradoxically Nigeria’s poverty enclave (Babawale, 
2003). 
Conversely, the unprecedented and embarrassing 
looting of the national treasury by officials at the highest 
level of state, as witnessed in the past years, is one of 
the consequences of over-concentration of resources at 
the centre far beyond what is required to administer the 
state. 
In view of the over-centralization and stupendous 
corruption of officials at the centre, the South-South 
Governors, members of the State Assemblies and 
members of the National Assemblies from the South-
South met in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State April 27 to 28; in 
2000 and after their deliberations issued a communiqué 
bordering on derivation with the following: 
 
1) The conference commended the president for 
releasing the 13% derivation fund to the oil producing 
States, it rejected: 
a) The implementation of the 13% derivation fund with 
effect from January 2000, instead of May 29, 1999 when 
the constitution came into force; 
b) The computation used for the 13% derivation fund 
excluded the 40% offshore component of the derivation 
principle in complete violation of the provisions of the 
1999 constitution; 
c) The non-inclusion of the gas component in the 
computation of the 13%; 
d) The payment of the first charge, debt servicing and 
other charges to the federation account before the 
computation of the 13%; 
e) The proposed presidential monitoring committee on 
the 13% derivation fund, and considered it ill-advised, 
misconceived and unnecessary; 
2) That the continental shelf, and the 2000 nautical miles 
exclusive economic zone recognized by the 1982 Law of 
the sea convention remains an integral part of the costal 
– states. The attempted reintroduction of the onshore/ 
offshore dichotomy by the Obasanjo administration is an 
affront to the rights of the people and government of the 
states of the South-South Zone;  
3) The National Assembly should  repeal  the  petroleum 
Act  of  1969,  the   inland   waterways  Act  and  all  other 
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obnoxious laws  governing  the  operation  of  the  oil and  
gas  industry; 
4) The penalties arising from gas flaring and 
environmental impact assessment violations should be 
paid to the impacted States as opposed to the current 
practice of paying to the Federal Government; 
5) The laws regulating the environment should fall within 
the authority of the federating units and therefore place 
on the concurrent list; 
6) The oil and gas companies should relocate their 
headquarters to the prime areas of production; 
7) The conference reaffirmed its commitment to the 
indivisibility of Nigeria provided it is based on the 
universal principles and practice of Federalism 
(Akinsanya and Ayoade, 2005: 157 – 8). 
Responding to the seven point issues raised, the 
Federal Government sought judicial interpretation of the 
sea ward boundary of a littoral state within the ambit of 
the federation in calculating the amount of revenue 
accruing to the federation account directly from any 
natural resources derived from the state pursuant to 
Section 162 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999. The Supreme Court ruled that (1) the 
sharing of derivation fund of 13% among oil producing 
states should begin on May 24 1999; (2) that gas should 
be part of the derivation; (3) that 1% direct allocation from 
the federation account to the Federal Capital Territory is 
illegal; 4) that the funding of the judiciary and payment to 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation – joint venture 
partners as first line charges from the federation account 
is unconstitutional; (5) that the servicing of external debt 
from the first line charges is unconstitutional; (6) that the 
non-payment of derivation on capital – gains tax and 
stamp duties is unconstitutional. The Federal Govern- 
ment was perpetually restrained from further violating the 
provision of the constitution on first line payment. The 
contention over the sea ward boundary of a littoral state 
within the Federal Republic of Nigeria was put at the low 
water mark of the land surface (as in the case of the 
Cross River State with an Archipelago  of Islands the 
seaward limits of island waters within the state) 
((ThisDay, Lagos: May, 2002; Ogundare, 2002: 20). 
There were mix reactions to this judgment by the Federal 
Government and South-South states… 
The perennial haggling over revenue allocation is 
indicative of how the country has deviated from the 
original idea of federalism (Tamuno, 1998), which was 
adopted by the founding fathers of the nation. Indeed, 
over centralization of power has stifled local initiative. 
Instead, it has promoted inefficiency and fostered a 
sense of over dependence on the Federal Government. 
In fact, it has created a situation, a system or mechanism 
that discourages work by having ‘booty’ which is shared 
every month. If people are not working but depend on 
booty sharing, they cannot increase economic activity.  
You cannot nurture people on a system of  booty  sharing 
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without production and expect development. 
According to Ojefia (2004:7), the agitation for resource 
control is rooted in the desire to promote the practice of 
fiscal federalism as the most efficient means of freeing 
Nigerians from the hangover of military authoritarianism 
and misrule. He noted that it enunciates a competitive 
federal system in which every component is able to 
exploit its vast economic potentials towards rapid 
development and progress of every section of the country 
(Tariton, 1965; O’Connell, 1970). An economic definition 
of a federal system of governments is one in which the 
expenditure and revenue functions are divided among 
different levels of government. The essence of this 
division is to ensure that one level of government does 
not monopolize the consumption of public goods and 
services in the federation. The fiscal relations in a federal 
system vary from country to country and each has unique 
features of its own. The main issue in intergovernmental 
fiscal relations concern spending responsibilities, 
revenue-raising responsibility, intergovernmental transfer 
and administrative aspect of fiscal decentralization 
(Nwabueze, 1993). Proponents of centralization argue 
that decentralization can create problems relating to 
distributional and microeconomic management objectives 
where there are great disparities in income and resources 
among the regions. Centralization will significantly reduce 
disparities in the provision of public goods and services 
as well as social and political tensions (Amucheazi, 
1980). Conversely, other scholars persuasively contend 
that poor political management and the erosion of 
democracy and constitutionalism, the poles which 
federalism hangs, and the consequent deepening of the 
crisis of the national question have made a return to the 
principle of relative autonomy for the states a necessary 
condition for the workability of the federal solution to the 
national question. It must be appreciated that 
intergovernmental fiscal relations is particularly significant 
for the following fundamental reasons: Firstly, it affects 
the allocation of administrative responsibilities because 
the financial resources available will place limits on the 
scope of administration which either level of governments 
is able to sustain. 
Secondly, it affects the political balance because 
whichever level of government has the major financial 
resources, finds in its hand the means of political control. 
Thirdly, it is significant also because the assignment of 
fiscal and expenditure powers will determine which 
governments are able to use these instruments to control 
the economy (Watts, 1970: 115). 
 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Australia 
 
The practice in Australia is to concentrate financial 
resources  at  the  centre  and  then  redistribute  them  to 
 
 
 
 
states in order to minimize disparities in the  provision  of 
public goods and services. The power to levy customs 
and excise duties is exclusively reserved for the central 
government, which also has monopoly over income tax. 
Here, two bodies are responsible for the administration 
and regulation of intergovernmental relations, namely, the 
Loan Council and the Commonwealth Grants commission 
(Watts, 1970: 125). The Loan Council is the body that 
authorizes both internal and external borrowing by the 
government. As a result of its responsibility, this body is 
dominated by the central government as reflected by the 
numbers of votes cast as against that of the seven 
constituent states. The Commonwealth Commission has 
the responsibility to manage intergovernmental relations 
in Australia. It not only investigate and applies for special 
grants for states, but also reviews the relative share of 
income tax revenue that accrue to states to ensure 
equitability in the provision of public goods and services. 
The commonwealth Grant Commission usually makes 
two types of grants, namely, unconditional grant in the 
form of tax reimbursement, and conditional grants which 
are financial assistance made upon conditions set by the 
central government. The conditional grants are usually 
used to implement nationwide policies in education, 
urban development, community health and urban 
transportation. The fundamental objective of this policy 
trust is to achieve a relative measure of reform and 
uniformity throughout the states and local governments. 
Furthermore, the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
fashioned out a fixed revenue sharing formula since 
1970s that is still in operation till today. By the sharing 
arrangement, the central government takes 64.78% of 
the personal income tax receipt, while the state and local 
governments are given 33.6 and 1.52%, respectively 
(Ebajemito and Abudu, 1999: 220). 
From this fiscal formula of the Australian experience, it 
is incontrovertible to assert that there is a high 
concentration of finance at the centre. Consequently, a 
high level of intergovernmental cooperation and coordi- 
nation between the central and state governments is 
required to achieve fiscal stabilization to compensate for 
the unequal economic impact of federation as well as 
minimize differences in the per capital revenue between 
component states. 
 
 
Canada 
 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Canada contrast with 
what obtains in Australia. There is no permanent institu- 
tion to manage intergovernmental fiscal relations. The 
federal provincial conference assisted by its continuing 
committee on fiscal and economic matters has performed 
this role on ad hoc basis (Meekinson, 1968). 
Canada represents a good example of a much more 
deeply rooted diversity of national origin, language, 
culture,   religion   and   judicial  system.  In  Canada,  the  
  
 
 
 
 
emphasis has been  on  provincial  diversity  even  in  the 
application of economic and fiscal policy. Although 
attention sometimes have been given to the problem of 
equalization among the province, the major emphasis 
recently has been on matching independent revenue to 
provincial expenditures in order to give the province 
maximum autonomy and more control over economic 
policy and development planning. 
According to Watts (1970: 121) in Canada, it appears 
that by the1950s there was a recognition that uniform 
central fiscal policies had failed to solve the problems of a 
differing incidence of unemployment in a number of 
province as aptly demonstrated in Nigeria today and this 
was accentuated by provincial pressure for the 
application of different fiscal policies to foster own 
regional development. The provinces accordingly have 
the power to both internal and external borrowing, which 
reinforced provincial autonomy and dialectically 
weakened central control over foreign exchange. 
 
 
United States of America 
 
In practice, the United States of America combines 
aspects of the financial concentration of power in 
Australia with Canada’s adhoc arrangements. The central 
government has considerable financial power and as a 
result usually lends funds to states and local govern- 
ments whose financial powers are restricted. 
The central government transfers funds to states and 
local governments in three ways, namely, through loans, 
grants-in-aid and revenue sharing. Revenue sharing in 
particular is used to implement certain policies usually 
aimed at promoting equality among the states or jurisdic- 
tions, providing incentives for recipient government to 
behave in certain ways, and making recipients adhere 
strictly to any conditions attached to the use of the funds. 
Funds are allocated among states and then within the 
states using the following criteria: population, relative 
income, tax efforts, urbanized population and personal 
income tax collection as indices for the revenue sharing.  
Allocation of funds within the state is based on 
population, per capita income and tax effort. States and 
local governments are required to adhere strictly to all 
conditions stipulated for shared revenue fund. 
Ebajemito and Abudu (1999: 222) support the afore-
mentioned view when they observed that the conditions 
used for revenue sharing are thus: 
 
a) Local government cannot use the funds for education, 
cash payments to welfare recipients, or for general 
administration. 
b) They cannot use the funds as matching share for a 
federal grant (that is counterpart fund). 
c) States cannot reduce net aid to local government 
below a given level as may be set by the federal 
government. 
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d) The recipient government of revenue sharing fund 
should not discriminate in employment or in the provision 
of service financed by the fund so received; and 
e) Revenue sharing funds must be used within twenty-
four months of collection. 
 
The central government sometimes assists other levels of 
government through “tax expenditure” by making tax 
payers forgo the interest earned on their income tax 
base. The most fundamental peculiarity of America 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangement is that it is 
designed to accommodate changes in social and 
economic circumstances. If there is the need for 
additional financial responsibility on the other levels of 
government, there will be commensurate grants to enable 
them perform this responsibility. 
For instance, states government in recent years is 
required to take up additional responsibility especially in 
public education funding and social welfare payments. 
For these, the central government granted more tax 
power as well as financial grants to carry out the added 
responsibilities, thus shifting budgetary pressures from 
federal to lower levels of government. 
 
 
Nigeria 
 
The intractable issue of the character of the Nigerian 
federation had been the unsettled battle for the basis of 
resources allocation to component units (fiscal 
federalism) (Ikejian and Ikejian, 1986). As Brian Smith 
had rightly explained that: Most of the arguments in 
Nigeria over the fiscal relationship between the federal 
and constituent levels of government have centers on the 
question of revenue allocations between the different 
parts of the country and the principles upon which 
distributions should be based (Barongo, 1983). These 
principles became a major cause of the inter-regional 
rivalry and conflict, which have dominated Nigeria politics 
(Dudley, 1982; Ozumba et al., eds.) 1999: 147). 
Five separate fiscal review commissions were 
established between 1946 to 1964 to investigate and 
recommend changes that would make revenue allocation 
system more equitable and efficient. These adhoc 
revenue commissions were followed by yet another 
series of review regimes between 1964 and 1995 
(National Constitutional Conference) that completely 
subordinated and strengthened the financial position of 
the federal government in relations to component units. It 
is instructive to emphasize here that in the pre-1969 
period, the principle of derivation predominated the 
resource sharing in their respective regions, but the shift 
from agro-based economy to petroleum as a major 
source of wealth since 1973 had made “derivation” an 
anathema in the hegemonic context of Nigeria federalism 
(Amuwo et al., 1998).   The   reason   is   that  while  
majority  ethnic groups then controlled  groundnut,  cocoa 
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and palm oil, the petroleum platforms now are located in 
the minority states of the South. 
Apart from the fact that fiscal allocation from few 
wealthy states to large dominant states has intractable 
problems, the principle upon which revenue allocation is 
based was adopted not to make it more equitable, but to 
be acceptable owing to the peculiar political 
circumstances. By this we mean the degree to which 
allocation was operationalized depended largely on who 
benefited and how powerful the beneficiary was relative 
to other states or regions/ethnic groups within the 
federation. Since the Nigerian military usurped political 
power in 1967, the essential characteristics of a unitary 
relationship have developed and are entrenched in the 
system (Elazor, 1977; also see Elazor, 1987). 
Consequently the federal government has dominated 
revenue allocation to the detriment of components units 
to the extent that local government allocations were 
disbursed directly to them without recourse to state 
government. 
 
 
Comparative analysis 
 
In the redistribution of financial resources in order to 
compensate for disparities in taxing capacity among 
states, there is an interesting difference between 
Australia and Canada. The disparities among state in 
Australia are much less than among Canadian provinces 
(Watts, 1970: 122-3). Yet in spite of the much greater 
disparity in Canada, Australia has done much more to 
redistribute the finance among its states. In Canada, 
there has been an equalization formula that has been 
designed to ensure that the per capita transfers to the 
provinces would produce per capita receipts for each 
province matching the average of the two wealthiest 
provinces. In other words, per capita receipts of the 
poorer province have been supplemented to bring them 
to the same level of the two wealthiest provinces. 
Conversely, Australia redistribution surpassed the 
Canadian example with the poorer states actually 
receiving substantially more per capita income than the 
wealthiest states. 
Thus, in Australia, there has been a major emphasis on 
the reduction of disparities, even at the expanse of state 
autonomy, through the operation of the Commonwealth 
Grants commission and the Loan Council, while Canada 
appears to have followed a pattern involving less 
redistribution but leaving the province with more auto- 
nomy (Watts, 1970: 123). Consequently, the Canadian 
example has the short coming that it provides no positive 
assistance towards reducing the gap between the 
wealthy and poor states but rather merely prevents it 
from widening.  
In   the   United   States   of  America,  revenue  sharing 
programme combines aspects of  vertical  and  horizontal 
 
 
 
 
revenue sharing by taking the taxing capacity, taxing 
efforts and per capita income of states and municipalities 
into account. Financial grant-in-aid is given by the central 
government as financial inducement for a state to 
undertake a project which is within the state’s 
constitutional responsibility, but which the national 
government wishes to encourage. For example, in the 
construction of highways and hospitals, financial grants 
are given to states to support them. As soon as the 
hospital or highway is completed, the state assumes full 
responsibility for operation and maintenance, and further 
federal supervision of the project becomes unnecessary 
(Akinyemi et al., 1979: 251). This situation contrasts with 
that of Nigeria where the federal road maintenance 
agency is locked in irreconcilable contention with some 
state agencies over the maintenance of federal roads in 
Nigeria. 
Grants-in-aid in the United States commonly run from 
50 to 90% of expenditure. The “earmarked” transfer of 
funds for support of specific projects or programmes is 
the key to the grant-in-aid programmes. And these 
nationally mandated projects must be executed according 
to specific standards that usually reflect national 
uniformity. These have decreased the scope of free 
legislative and administrative choice by individual states. 
In Nigeria, the constitution makers considered it 
unnecessary to impose constitutional limitation on the 
spending power of the federal government. This has 
allowed the federal government to use its wider and more 
elastic power to tax and to borrow, as support for its 
spending power, in order to influence the performance of 
functions constitutionally allocated to the state 
governments. The distribution of conditional grants to 
state governments in Nigeria has been inequitable, 
unrealistic and delay in the release of funds for projects 
already approved is disturbing. The most urgent problem 
now is how to achieve a seemingly impartial distribution 
of federal discretionary grants, which facilitate the 
realization of the national objectives and at the same 
time, enhances the financial capability of state 
governments to provide better service to their people. 
Indeed this is one of the essential conditions for ensuring 
a more harmonious federal union now and in the future. 
In view of the foregoing therefore, it is instructive to 
emphasize that the whole purpose of having federal 
standards, procedures and regulations which guide the 
disbursement and use of federal grants by the state 
governments is to ensure that such money is prudently 
spent on specific matters or projects for which they have 
been committed. Realities in Nigeria indicated that state 
governments like the central government have spent their 
resources according to the whims and caprices of the 
president or Governor as exemplified by the federal and 
state government 5 million and 240 million dollars 
financial   gift   to   Soa   Tome   and  Principe  and  Niger 
Republic   respectively   in   support    of    this    country’s 
  
 
 
 
 
democratic process. As presently constituted, the 
national Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission lack requisite technical expertise and 
impartiality to carry out it assignment. This is further 
compounded by the advisory role of fiscal revenue 
commission whose membership were drawn from 
persons nominated by the President of the Federal 
Republic most of whom are politicians rather than 
technocrats and could naturally dance to the tone of their 
mentors. 
Another problem is in sub-section 8 of section 162 of 
the 1999 constitution, which provides that each state 
shall pay to local government councils in its area of 
jurisdiction such proportion of its revenue on such terms 
and in such manner as may be prescribed by the House 
of Assembly of the state. The reality today is that this 
provision has only transferred the friction between the 
federal government and the states over the past 
arrangement to the states and has now caused disputes 
between the state governments and local governments 
over the mode of disbursement of federally allocated 
revenue to the local government councils (Jinadu, 1985, 
also see Jinadu, 1987).  
In addition, the controversy between the federal 
government and the state government on the number of 
local governments recognized under the constitution by 
which the federal allocations to local government councils 
are made and also on the mode of determining the 
proportional allocation from the federation account to 
both the state and local governments’ have continued 
unabated. 
Nwokedi (2001: 145) observed that there is no doubt 
that under the existing 1999 constitution, the powers and 
revenue accruing to the federal government are 
awesome and completely undermines the doctrine of true 
federalism. The present constitution is akin to the past 
military regimes which created an all powerful federal 
government with lion share of the revenue accruing to the 
federal government while the powers of the states were 
drastically diminished and financially weakened 
(Osaghae, 1998), to the extent that none of them could 
survive or discharge its constitutional responsibilities 
adequately under the existing constitutional and revenue 
sharing arrangement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the United States, there is no formal machinery 
responsible for an overview of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. In Switzerland, intergovernmental meetings of 
finance ministers work out proposals for an equalization 
formula. In Germany, the unique role of the Budesrat in 
intergovernmental matters makes it closer to the 
Australian example. 
In Canada, the emphasis has been diversity and 
provincial autonomy while in Australia; the emphasis  has 
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been the equalization of state resources and upon central 
paramouncy. Australia serves an example of the extent to 
which the redistribution of resources and the effort to 
provide uniform services may be a unifying force. On the 
other hand, the reaction in Canada against over 
centralization illustrates the requirement of substantial 
financial autonomy if states or province are to preserve 
their political autonomy. 
In view of the foregoing comparative analysis, a 
synthesis of Nigeria intergovernmental fiscal relations 
during colonial and post colonial period indicate the 
dominance of adhoc revenue commission until the 
establishment of an incorporation of the revenue 
mobilization allocation and fiscal commission into the 199 
constitution. While Adebayo Adedeji supports a 
constitutionally established revenue commission like the 
Australian Commonwealth Grants commission, Ralph 
Nwokedi prefers an adhoc body of experts empanelled 
periodically (preferably every five years) to prepare a 
report and recommendation on revenue allocation 
formula, which should be submitted to a high powered 
revenue review committee.  
Nwokedi maintained that the committee should be 
composed of equal accredited representatives of the six 
geo-political zones, under the Chairmanship of the Vice-
president of the Federal Republic. The conclusion and 
recommendations of the committee, based on the expert 
report shall then be tabled before the National Council of 
States which for this purpose, shall include the President 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and shall be presided over by the 
President of the Federal Republic. The council’s 
deliberations and conclusion shall form the basis of 
revenue allocation procedure to be established under the 
constitution. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following recommendations are hereby presented: 
 
1) To optimize political, security and socio-economic 
benefits of the coming together of the multifarious Nigeria 
ethnic nationalities in a federation, the authoritarian fiscal 
centralism that have been promoted and institutionalized 
by successive military regimes since 1966 has to be 
revised and replaced by an ethnocentric (state) and more 
democratic fiscal federalism. 
2) The revenue base of the states should be broadened 
by giving them ownership and more control over 
productive natural resources, that is, their exploitation 
and utilization. 
3) Tax revenue available to the states is presently limited 
due to the encroachment of  the  central  government on 
source that ordinarily should accrue to the state. 
4) The federation account should be operated by a body 
made up of states representative rather  than  its  present 
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dominance by federal appointed officials who use it more 
as patronage than as instrument for promoting even 
development. 
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